They're listening.
We tell you when, from where, and what to do about it.
In the Pegasus era, any protected person — journalist, executive, diplomat, case officer — walks through hostile cellular surveillance they cannot see. IMSI catchers, rogue base stations, SS7 exploits, silent SMS pings, encryption-downgrade attacks. Bastion is a family of passive cellular monitors that detect, classify, and locate hostile intercept gear operating against a protected asset. It never intercepts anything. It only tells you when something is looking at you.
Cellular is the invisible tradecraft layer nobody defends.
Every protected person carries a cellular device. That device is the single largest untrusted surface in their operational posture. The post-Pegasus disclosures (2021–2024) made one thing clear: the intercept ecosystem is global, industrialized, and targets civilians as routinely as it targets military operations.
IMSI / stingray catchers
Rogue base stations impersonate a legitimate operator cell, force nearby phones to attach, extract IMSI/IMEI, downgrade encryption (A5/0 null cipher, 2G fallback), and intercept plaintext voice/SMS. Modern variants attempt LTE→2G and 5G→LTE downgrades.
Signaling-protocol exploits
SS7 and Diameter attacks (from operator-side compromise or rogue peer networks) enable location tracking, SMS interception, and call redirection without any airside presence near the target.
Silent SMS / Type-0 paging
Class-0 SMS messages that never display on the handset but trigger baseband response — used for stealth location confirmation ahead of a physical operation.
Encryption downgrade
Forced fallback from A5/3 to A5/1 (cryptographically broken) on GSM, or from LTE EEA1/EEA2 to EEA0 (null cipher), to enable live cleartext decoding of traffic.
Location inference
Commercial location-data brokers, operator-side queries, and forced LAC/TAC updates all leak location at tower-granularity without any intercept of content.
Endpoint implants
NSO-class zero-click implants. Out of scope for Bastion (we don't detect compromised-phone malware — that's MVT / Lookout territory), but the cellular layer is the attacker's discovery and delivery channel.
A passive listener that never intercepts.
Bastion is counter-SIGINT at the cellular layer. It watches the cellular RF environment around a protected asset and flags hostile intercept gear in real time. It is the ground/personal counterpart to Nexus Atlas Blackbird (airborne emitter detection) and Phantom (RF deception). The three together constitute our counter-ISR family.
Passive only
Bastion never transmits, never attaches to cells, never intercepts content. Zero legal exposure as interception equipment. Clean ECCN 5.A.1 counter-surveillance category.
Detection-grade fidelity
Rule-based IoC detection plus ML classifier on RF fingerprints plus baseline-anomaly detection. Three pipelines fused by a correlation engine — not a single heuristic.
Library-driven, subscription-refreshed
The moat is the cellular signature library — operator fingerprints + catcher variants — updated continuously from fleet telemetry. The box commoditizes in 24 months. The library does not.
Three tiers. One protected person, one vehicle, one site.
A single product architecture scaled across three physical form factors. Shared detection stack, shared library, shared backend. Different antenna arrays, different channel counts, different customer segments.
Pocket device, ~150 g. USB-C + BLE pairing to a paired phone or tablet. 2G/3G/4G complete, 5G NSA/SA basics. Passive sniffer + anomaly detector + silent haptic alerting.
- AD9361 SDR, 70 MHz – 6 GHz, 56 MHz IBW, 12-bit
- NXP i.MX 8M Plus SoC + 2.3 TOPS NPU
- 5 000 mAh battery · 8 h active, 48 h sleep
- ATECC608 secure element, tamper sensors
- Dual internal antennas, polarization-diverse
- Silent haptic + BLE earpiece + paired app
Trunk or glovebox unit with external multi-band antennas. 24/7 operation, vehicle power. Adds direction-of-arrival estimation for rogue cells. Integration with vehicle comms and EP team radios.
- 2× AD9361 coherent chain (4 RX channels)
- GPSDO for nanosecond time reference across antennas
- IP66 vehicle enclosure, 12 V + backup battery
- 4 external SMA antennas: whip · discone · directional patch
- Coarse DF (±10°) for rogue cell bearing
- Encrypted mesh link to paired Bastion-S units in-car
Ruggedized fixed-site installation with high-gain directional antenna array. Continuous 6-band monitoring. Active DF to locate rogue BTS. SOC feed + building-security integration.
- Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ RFSoC ZU21DR · 8 coherent chains · 14-bit · 5 GS/s
- 4–8 element phased array · per-band · DF-capable
- NEMA outdoor or 2U rack · 48 V DC / PoE++
- Ethernet + fiber backhaul
- SS7/Diameter anomaly feed (via operator-side partnership)
- Physical security system + SIEM integration
Ten classes of indicator. Correlated, weighted, confidence-scored.
No single indicator is conclusive. A rogue base station typically trips five to eight indicators simultaneously. Bastion's correlation engine fuses weighted rule hits with baseline-anomaly scores and RF-fingerprint confidence to produce one of four states: Green Amber Red Critical
| Indicator | Signal | Adversary intent | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|
| Unexpected cell appearance | New cell ID at location not in baseline | Rogue BTS staged near target | Medium |
| Cell ID conflict | Same PLMN/cell ID observed from two bearings | ID cloning of legitimate tower | High |
| Absent authentication (AKA) | Observed attach without SIM challenge | Cell can't respond to challenge = not real operator | High |
| Encryption downgrade | A5/1, A5/0, EEA0 forced; 2G fallback from LTE/5G | Enable live plaintext capture | Critical |
| Silent paging / Type-0 SMS | Class-0 SMS with no UI surface | Stealth location ping | High |
| RF fingerprint mismatch | TX imperfection vector outside operator library | Unknown hardware (typical of catcher) | Critical |
| Neighbor-cell list anomaly | Real BTS: 6–12 neighbors. Catcher: 0–2. | Catcher doesn't know operator topology | High |
| LAC/TAC churn | Repeated forced location-area updates | Force reattach to compromised cell | Medium |
| Abnormal reattach rate | UE forced to re-attach unusually often | Signal engineering for compromise | Medium |
| Signaling-plane anomaly | SS7/Diameter abuse via operator feed (Bastion-X) | Network-side tracking | Critical |
Know who's watching.
The signature library is built backwards from known adversary hardware. Each catcher class has a distinctive RF fingerprint footprint, a characteristic signaling behavior, and a typical deployment pattern. Cataloging adversary variants is the research heart of the product.
NSO · Paragon · Candiru · Gamma
Endpoint implants (Pegasus / Graphite / DevilsTongue / FinSpy) rely on cellular delivery. Bastion detects the associated cellular infrastructure — delivery cells, paging cells, SMS campaign cells — rather than the implants themselves.
Septier · R&S · Verint / Cognyte
Legitimate LI kit sold to customers who use it adversarially. Distinctive hardware fingerprints from these vendors form a primary library category.
Chinese GF/PLA · Russian Leer-3
State-manufactured tactical IMSI catchers. Leer-3 is an RB-341V truck-mounted EW/SIGINT system with cellular-catcher payload. Chinese equivalents widely deployed along sensitive borders and for overseas operations.
Harris · L3Harris · Gemalto
Law-enforcement-grade catchers, widely proliferated. Not all uses are hostile, but the same devices show up in adversarial hands. Classic fingerprint targets.
YateBTS · OpenBTS · srsRAN-based rogues
Attackers increasingly use open-source cellular stacks on commodity SDR hardware (BladeRF, Pluto, USRP). Cheaper to build, harder to fingerprint — but still detectable via protocol-behavior anomalies even when hardware fingerprint is ambiguous.
Research / boutique builds
Tailored catchers from national labs or specialty shops. Rare, but the highest-threat class — used for highest-value targets. Detectable via protocol anomalies even when the hardware is unknown to the library.
Antenna to alert ladder in under two seconds.
Passive RF capture, baseband DSP, per-standard protocol decoding, three-pipeline detection engine, correlation, alert ladder. All on-device for privacy; only alert metadata and flagged IQ snippets leave for backend library updates.
┌──────────────────────── BASTION-S · SIGNAL PATH ───────────────────────┐ │ │ │ ANTENNAS │ │ ┌─────────┐ ┌──────────┐ │ │ │ WIDEBAND│ │ 5G PATCH │ ← polarization-diverse │ │ │ 0.6–3GHz│ │ 3.3–6GHz │ internal to unibody │ │ └────┬────┘ └─────┬────┘ │ │ │ │ │ │ ┌────▼──────────────▼────┐ │ │ │ LNA + FILTER BANK │ ← SAW filters, 5 cellular bands │ │ │ (band-switched) │ │ │ └────────┬───────────────┘ │ │ │ │ │ ┌────────▼─────────┐ │ │ │ SDR · AD9361 │ ← 70 MHz – 6 GHz, 56 MHz IBW, 12-bit │ │ │ 2×2 MIMO, 12-bit │ │ │ └────────┬─────────┘ │ │ │ IQ samples (DMA) │ │ ┌────────▼─────────┐ │ │ │ BASEBAND DSP │ ← sync, channel est., demod │ │ └───┬────────┬─────┘ │ │ │ │ │ │ ┌────▼───┐ ┌──▼────────┐ ┌──────────┐ │ │ │PROTOCOL│ │RF FINGER- │ │ RAW-IQ │ ← 24h rolling triage buffer │ │ │DECODER │ │PRINT │ │ BUFFER │ │ │ │GSM·UMTS│ │EXTRACTOR │ │ │ │ │ │LTE·5G │ │(32-dim) │ │ │ │ │ └────┬───┘ └──┬────────┘ └──────────┘ │ │ │ │ │ │ ┌────▼────────▼────────┐ │ │ │ DETECTION ENGINE │ │ │ │ rules + ML + baseline│ │ │ │ correlation │ │ │ └───────────┬──────────┘ │ │ │ │ │ ┌───────────▼──────────┐ │ │ │ ALERT LADDER │ Green · Amber · Red · Critical │ │ └───┬──────────────┬───┘ │ │ │ │ │ │ ▼ ▼ │ │ HAPTIC BLE → paired app / earpiece │ │ │ └────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ ▼ (tethered upload) ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐ │ BACKEND — threat-intel + library │ │ ├ analyst-reviewed novel anomalies │ │ ├ operator fingerprint DB │ │ ├ IMSI-catcher variant library │ │ └ signed OTA library push to fleet │ └──────────────────────────────────────┘
The library would be the product.
Hardware commoditizes in 24 months. The library does not. Two families of signatures form the moat: operator RF fingerprints (what real cells look like at RF, per operator, per region, per vendor) and IMSI-catcher variant library (what known hostile hardware looks like). The former is huge and slow-building; the latter is smaller and evolves weekly as adversary kit is captured, analyzed, or red-teamed.
Operator clean captures
Per-operator, per-region captures of real BTS broadcast channels under known-good conditions. Builds the "what real hardware looks like" library. Target: 40+ operators, 200+ regions, multiple BTS vendors per operator. Concept — captures not started.
Adversary kit reverse-engineering
Captured adversary catchers, open-source catcher software running on reference SDR hardware (used as controlled red-team targets), and published research papers characterizing specific surveillance vendors' RF signatures.
Fleet telemetry (future)
Once Bastion-S is deployed: every anomaly flagged by every device becomes a library input. With 10 K devices pushing telemetry, the library becomes self-improving. This is the disruption economics: incumbents can't match.
Partner threat-intel
Access to journalist-protection orgs (Access Now, Citizen Lab, CPJ), academic researchers (SRLabs, Amnesty Security Lab), and allied-government SIGINT feeds (via cleared partnerships). Contributors get priority on derived signatures.
Synthetic red-team
Run controlled rogue-BTS deployments in RF-shielded labs; characterize output; feed to library as synthetic adversary variants. Essential for catching novel variants before adversaries deploy them.
Continuous refresh
Adversary kit evolves. Library patches pushed on SLA. Target refresh cadence: high-threat regions weekly; stable regions monthly. Subscription-funded operation.
Every real BTS has an imperfection fingerprint.
A real cellular base station is built from production hardware — Huawei BTS3900, Ericsson RBS 6201, Nokia Flexi, ZTE Wireless. Each unit has characteristic RF imperfections that don't show up in the protocol but are measurable in the IQ samples. A rogue base station built from USRP / BladeRF / purpose-built catcher hardware leaves different imperfections. Match vectors against the operator library; mismatches are the single most reliable detection signal.
Feature vector (~32 dimensions)
| Carrier Frequency Offset | Crystal stability signature, correlation residual after sync |
| Sample timing offset | PHY implementation fingerprint from timing recovery |
| IQ imbalance (gain) | Mixer / DAC signature |
| IQ imbalance (phase) | Same |
| Phase noise envelope | LO quality signature; PSD of residual phase |
| TX transient (on/off) | PA design fingerprint from burst edges |
| Spectral mask tilt | Filter characteristics; PSD slope across channel |
| EVM constellation pattern | Calibration fingerprint; error vector distribution |
| Spurious emissions | Out-of-channel PSD; hardware quirks |
| Intermodulation products | PA non-linearity signature |
Why this works against catchers
A Huawei BTS3900 and a HackRF running OpenBTS have vastly different imperfection profiles — different crystals, different mixers, different PAs, different filters. Even when the catcher correctly impersonates an operator at the protocol layer, the underlying hardware leaves tells at the analog layer.
Research basis: Rajendran et al. (SenSys 2019), Sankhe et al. (INFOCOM 2019), the ORACLE/DIRECTION work, Princeton RFEye papers. Production-grade RF fingerprinting moved from research to viable product only in 2022–2024.
Illustrative. No system built yet. This is the mission we would solve.
A journalist meets a sensitive source in Istanbul. The local intelligence service has an interest. The meeting venue is a café on a busy street — legitimate cells everywhere, any of which could be cloned.
Nine segments. All underserved today.
Bastion's buyer base is broad because the threat is broad. What these segments share: high-value individuals or sites, credible cellular-surveillance exposure, and no incumbent vendor serving their price band.
| Segment | Buyer | Typical ACV | Sales motion |
|---|---|---|---|
| Journalist protection | CPJ, RSF, major media orgs | $5–50K / yr / reporter bundle | Post-Pegasus urgency; NGO grants |
| Executive protection | EP firms, corporate CISOs | $50–500K / site | Enterprise sales via EP vendor channel |
| Diplomatic / embassy | MFAs, embassies, consulates | $100K–2M / site | Government procurement |
| SOF / case officer | Tier-1 SOF, national intel | Classified | Direct-to-agency; cleared channel |
| HNW family office | Family offices, private security | $30–100K / family | Referral network; private security integrator |
| Political campaign | Campaign security (post-Pegasus world) | $20–100K / campaign | Cyclical; election-cycle spikes |
| Human rights defender | NGOs, donors (OSF, Ford, MacArthur) | Subsidized / at-cost | Mission-driven; grant-funded |
| Law firm M&A / arbitration | Big-law partners, arbitration firms | $50–200K / war-room | B2B via firm general counsel |
| Corporate counterintelligence | Fortune 500 CISOs | $50–300K / program | Enterprise; multi-year |
The adversary adapts. So does the library.
Catchers evolve. Adversaries retune hardware, rotate software, update protocols. Library refresh cadence is the product's operational promise. A library six months stale is a library that's being defeated in the field. This is why the subscription model is the actual business — not the hardware.
Hardware replacement
Vendor ships new SKU; RF fingerprint shifts. Detected at our red-team lab or via fleet telemetry. New library entry within 2–4 weeks.
Protocol re-tuning
Catcher software adjusts neighbor-cell lists, authentication behavior, encryption advertisement to mimic real operator more closely. Detection rules updated; weights rebalanced.
Detection evasion
Adversary learns Bastion exists; designs specifically to evade it. Mitigations: multiple detection pipelines (hardware fingerprint + protocol + baseline anomaly), so evading one still trips others.
A captured device yields nothing.
Bastion devices are carried by high-threat individuals. Device capture is a realistic scenario. Every design decision assumes the device will eventually be in adversary hands.
Secure-boot chain
ROM → signed SPL → signed U-Boot → signed kernel → dm-verity rootfs. Keys sealed in ATECC608B secure element. No unsigned firmware accepted ever.
Crypto-shred on tamper
Accelerometer threshold + capacitive breach sensor + thermal anomaly → zero out keys, zero out library, scrub volatile memory. <100 ms from trigger to inoperability.
Library segmentation
Each device carries only the signatures relevant to its threat-intel region. Capturing one device exposes a regional subset, not the global library.
Encrypted at rest
LUKS + dm-verity; library in HSM-sealed volume. Physical extraction of storage yields ciphertext without the keys-in-ATECC608 the device destroys on tamper.
No user-extractable secrets
Protected person never holds library keys. No passphrase can unlock forensic mode. Recovery is factory-re-flash, period.
Cover enclosures
Planned variants: magnetic-case-clipped-to-phone, notebook-insert, power-bank lookalike. Reduces visual signature in hostile contexts.
A barbell market. Nothing in the middle, where the buyers are.
Cellular counter-surveillance has two existing ends: enterprise ($500K+ Delma, Airbus, R&S) and consumer (free: EFF Crocodile Hunter, SnoopSnitch, Amnesty MVT). Between them — pocket-size professional-grade devices at $2–10K — there is nothing. That's where Bastion lives.
Consumer: EFF, SRLabs, Amnesty — academic or volunteer engineering; no commercial-grade reliability, support, backend, or distribution. Cannot upmarket without becoming commercial companies, which most explicitly don't want.
The middle — the actual buyers, at $2–10K / year per device, paying for reliability and subscription intelligence — is empty.
Nobody does what Bastion would do.
| System | Form | Price | Library refresh | RF-fingerprint | 5G SA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Delma (IL) | Enterprise rack | $500K+ | annual | limited | partial |
| Airbus SLC | Enterprise platform | $1M+ | annual | no | partial |
| Rohde & Schwarz | Mil-grade / briefcase | $200K+ | manual | limited | partial |
| Septier | Enterprise | $500K+ | annual | limited | partial |
| GSMK CryptoPhone | Secure-phone (prevention) | $3K / phone | n/a | no | no |
| Cellebrite | Forensics | $$$ | n/a | no | no |
| SnoopSnitch | Android app | free | rare | no | no |
| EFF Crocodile Hunter | Researcher tool | free | volunteer | no | no |
| SRLabs Darshak | Researcher tool | free | volunteer | no | no |
| Amnesty MVT | Forensics only | free | n/a | no | no |
| BASTION (concept) | Pocket · Vehicle · Site | $2–100K | continuous (subscription) | yes · primary | yes (target) |
Don't attack the top. Disrupt from below.
Competing head-on with Delma, Airbus, or R&S in the enterprise market would fail. Their incumbency is 10+ years deep; their certifications are a 3–5 year moat; their export channels are pre-cleared; their procurement relationships are entrenched. A Bulgarian concept-stage startup cannot displace that on day one. The strategy is sequential.
Underserved segment
NGOs · journalists · EP firms · HNW family offices · individual C-suite executives · HRDs · small diplomatic missions. Incumbents literally won't sell here — deal sizes are too small for their cost structure. We own them by default.
Mid-market expansion
Accumulated references, case studies, library maturity, first certifications. Move up to mid-size EP firms, corporate CISOs, regional government agencies, small embassies. R&S is too expensive for them; SnoopSnitch is not serious enough. Bastion fits.
Enterprise disruption
Armed with 10K+ deployed devices and 5 years of real-world threat-intel, show up in enterprise RFPs against R&S. Value prop: "Our library is continuously updated from 10,000 active sensors. Yours ships annually. Here's what we caught this month that your firmware missed."
Three products. One counter-ISR doctrine.
Bastion completes the Nexus Atlas counter-ISR family. Each product addresses a different layer of the adversary's intelligence cycle; together they form a closed loop with a shared signature-library moat.
Blackbird
Small autonomous drone. Flies out, finds adversary RF emitters (drones, radars, datalinks) in contested airspace, returns a target list. "Hunt the hunters."
Phantom
Distributed ground emitter swarm. Emits library replicas of high-value targets. Adversary SIGINT cycles waste themselves on empty positions. "Let them shoot where you are not."
Bastion
Personal / vehicle / fixed-site cellular monitor. Detects adversary intercept gear targeting you or your asset. "They're listening. We tell you when, from where, and what to do about it."
┌──────────────── NEXUS ATLAS COUNTER-ISR FAMILY · CLOSED LOOP ────────┐ │ │ │ BLACKBIRD PHANTOM BASTION │ │ (airborne detect) (RF deception) (cellular detect) │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ▼ ▼ ▼ │ │ adversary drones adversary SIGINT hostile cellular │ │ + radar emitters cycle corrupted intercept gear │ │ │ │ │ │ │ └──────── shared library moat ───────────────────┘ │ │ operator + adversary │ │ RF fingerprint database │ │ │ │ ┌── Bastion detects hostile catcher ──────────┐ │ │ │ → target emitter added to Blackbird list │ │ │ │ → Phantom can fake cellular if desired │ │ │ └──────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │ │ │ └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Counter-surveillance, not interception.
The single most important strategic point about Bastion: it sells as counter-surveillance equipment, not interception equipment. This is a clean ECCN 5.A.1 counter-surveillance category — not on the EU Dual-Use 2021/821 Annex I 5.A.1.f interception list.
ECCN 5.A.1 counter-surveillance
Routinely licensed for EU / NATO / allied customers. Not on interception / lawful-intercept lists. Wassenaar cat 5.A.1 counter-surveillance goods — standard export.
EU + UN legitimization
EU PEGA Committee (2023) explicitly endorsed defensive cellular-security tools for civilians. UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression (2023) called for such tools. FTC / state AG frameworks put defensive tools on clean footing.
Counter-SIGINT, not surveillance
Zero NSO-class contamination risk. Acquirable by legitimate acquirers (Cognyte, Palantir, Anduril, L3Harris, major primes). Investable by defense-specialist funds. Sellable to NGOs and governments alike.
Never interception
Bastion cannot be configured to intercept cellular content. No active mode. No silent-attach. No rogue-BTS emulation. The product physically lacks the capability — by design, for regulatory and reputational cleanliness.
Concept phase. Pre-prototype. Idea presented for partner interest.
Bastion is currently a concept being presented for early partner interest. Nothing is built or deployed. The roadmap below is what we would execute, given funding and partnership.
Bench prototype
- HackRF / BladeRF + Raspberry Pi bench build
- srsRAN + Osmocom detection stack
- ~200 operator-region fingerprint captures in Sofia
- Rule-based detector validated on known-good + red-team catcher targets
- First conversations: CPJ / Access Now / journalist org partners
Reference hardware
- AD9361 + i.MX 8M Plus custom carrier board
- Port detection stack to embedded Linux
- RF fingerprinting pipeline (research → production)
- Library to 500–1,000 operator-region pairs
- First red-team assessment (external)
Bastion-S pre-prototype
- First custom industrial design + enclosure
- Integration testing against YateBTS/OpenBTS targets
- ATECC608 + tamper chain
- First 50 pre-production units · closed partner deployment
- Controller/SOC v1.0
First production batch
- First production run (volumes driven by partner demand)
- Library refresh subscription live
- Bastion-V variant enters design
- FIPS 140-3 submission
- NGO / EP firm / journalist-org pilots at scale
If the concept resonates, reach out via Nexus Atlas channels. We'll treat your interest with the same tradecraft discipline we built into the product.