Project Bastion · Cellular Counter-Surveillance · Concept · TRL 1–2

They're listening.
We tell you when, from where, and what to do about it.

Detect hostile cellular intercept. Protect your people, your sites, your conversations.

In the Pegasus era, any protected person — journalist, executive, diplomat, case officer — walks through hostile cellular surveillance they cannot see. IMSI catchers, rogue base stations, SS7 exploits, silent SMS pings, encryption-downgrade attacks. Bastion is a family of passive cellular monitors that detect, classify, and locate hostile intercept gear operating against a protected asset. It never intercepts anything. It only tells you when something is looking at you.

Concept phase. Bastion is an idea being presented for early partner interest. Nothing is built yet. This page describes the product we would build with funding and partnership. All numbers below — device counts, accuracy percentages, library sizes, detection latencies — are design targets, not measurements.
600MHz–6GHz
Target coverage
2G · 3G · 4G · 5G NSA/SA detection across common operator bands.
<2s
Alert latency (target)
From first detection to silent haptic alert at the protected person.
4-state
Alert ladder
Green · Amber · Red · Critical. User sees only what matters.
Concept
Library status
Operator RF fingerprints + catcher variants — acquisition plan mapped, not yet acquired.

Cellular is the invisible tradecraft layer nobody defends.

Every protected person carries a cellular device. That device is the single largest untrusted surface in their operational posture. The post-Pegasus disclosures (2021–2024) made one thing clear: the intercept ecosystem is global, industrialized, and targets civilians as routinely as it targets military operations.

Attack Class 01

IMSI / stingray catchers

Rogue base stations impersonate a legitimate operator cell, force nearby phones to attach, extract IMSI/IMEI, downgrade encryption (A5/0 null cipher, 2G fallback), and intercept plaintext voice/SMS. Modern variants attempt LTE→2G and 5G→LTE downgrades.

Attack Class 02

Signaling-protocol exploits

SS7 and Diameter attacks (from operator-side compromise or rogue peer networks) enable location tracking, SMS interception, and call redirection without any airside presence near the target.

Attack Class 03

Silent SMS / Type-0 paging

Class-0 SMS messages that never display on the handset but trigger baseband response — used for stealth location confirmation ahead of a physical operation.

Attack Class 04

Encryption downgrade

Forced fallback from A5/3 to A5/1 (cryptographically broken) on GSM, or from LTE EEA1/EEA2 to EEA0 (null cipher), to enable live cleartext decoding of traffic.

Attack Class 05

Location inference

Commercial location-data brokers, operator-side queries, and forced LAC/TAC updates all leak location at tower-granularity without any intercept of content.

Attack Class 06

Endpoint implants

NSO-class zero-click implants. Out of scope for Bastion (we don't detect compromised-phone malware — that's MVT / Lookout territory), but the cellular layer is the attacker's discovery and delivery channel.

Adversary kit in the wild
The commercial surveillance industry — NSO, Paragon, Candiru, Gamma — and lawful-intercept vendors re-deployed adversarially (Septier, R&S gear in hostile hands) constitute the known adversary landscape. Chinese state-produced catchers (GF/PLA variants), Russian Leer-3 and successors, and open-source rogue deployments (YateBTS, OpenBTS) complete the picture. Bastion's library is designed to detect all of them.

A passive listener that never intercepts.

Bastion is counter-SIGINT at the cellular layer. It watches the cellular RF environment around a protected asset and flags hostile intercept gear in real time. It is the ground/personal counterpart to Nexus Atlas Blackbird (airborne emitter detection) and Phantom (RF deception). The three together constitute our counter-ISR family.

Axiom 01

Passive only

Bastion never transmits, never attaches to cells, never intercepts content. Zero legal exposure as interception equipment. Clean ECCN 5.A.1 counter-surveillance category.

Axiom 02

Detection-grade fidelity

Rule-based IoC detection plus ML classifier on RF fingerprints plus baseline-anomaly detection. Three pipelines fused by a correlation engine — not a single heuristic.

Axiom 03

Library-driven, subscription-refreshed

The moat is the cellular signature library — operator fingerprints + catcher variants — updated continuously from fleet telemetry. The box commoditizes in 24 months. The library does not.

Three tiers. One protected person, one vehicle, one site.

A single product architecture scaled across three physical form factors. Shared detection stack, shared library, shared backend. Different antenna arrays, different channel counts, different customer segments.

Tier 02 · Vehicle
Bastion-V
$8,000 – $15,000

Trunk or glovebox unit with external multi-band antennas. 24/7 operation, vehicle power. Adds direction-of-arrival estimation for rogue cells. Integration with vehicle comms and EP team radios.

  • 2× AD9361 coherent chain (4 RX channels)
  • GPSDO for nanosecond time reference across antennas
  • IP66 vehicle enclosure, 12 V + backup battery
  • 4 external SMA antennas: whip · discone · directional patch
  • Coarse DF (±10°) for rogue cell bearing
  • Encrypted mesh link to paired Bastion-S units in-car
diplomatic motorcade · SOF mobile · EP driver
Tier 03 · Fixed Site
Bastion-X
$25,000 – $100,000

Ruggedized fixed-site installation with high-gain directional antenna array. Continuous 6-band monitoring. Active DF to locate rogue BTS. SOC feed + building-security integration.

  • Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ RFSoC ZU21DR · 8 coherent chains · 14-bit · 5 GS/s
  • 4–8 element phased array · per-band · DF-capable
  • NEMA outdoor or 2U rack · 48 V DC / PoE++
  • Ethernet + fiber backhaul
  • SS7/Diameter anomaly feed (via operator-side partnership)
  • Physical security system + SIEM integration
embassy · executive residence · infra
Controller / SOC software
Web + mobile application for the protected person's security team. Real-time alerts, historical timeline, threat-intel feed, fleet health, integration with EP workflows and (in planned later phases) ATAK, Palantir, enterprise SIEMs via syslog/CEF. Target pricing: $1 K/yr per personal device, $5 K/yr per site.

Ten classes of indicator. Correlated, weighted, confidence-scored.

No single indicator is conclusive. A rogue base station typically trips five to eight indicators simultaneously. Bastion's correlation engine fuses weighted rule hits with baseline-anomaly scores and RF-fingerprint confidence to produce one of four states: Green Amber Red Critical

IndicatorSignalAdversary intentWeight
Unexpected cell appearanceNew cell ID at location not in baselineRogue BTS staged near targetMedium
Cell ID conflictSame PLMN/cell ID observed from two bearingsID cloning of legitimate towerHigh
Absent authentication (AKA)Observed attach without SIM challengeCell can't respond to challenge = not real operatorHigh
Encryption downgradeA5/1, A5/0, EEA0 forced; 2G fallback from LTE/5GEnable live plaintext captureCritical
Silent paging / Type-0 SMSClass-0 SMS with no UI surfaceStealth location pingHigh
RF fingerprint mismatchTX imperfection vector outside operator libraryUnknown hardware (typical of catcher)Critical
Neighbor-cell list anomalyReal BTS: 6–12 neighbors. Catcher: 0–2.Catcher doesn't know operator topologyHigh
LAC/TAC churnRepeated forced location-area updatesForce reattach to compromised cellMedium
Abnormal reattach rateUE forced to re-attach unusually oftenSignal engineering for compromiseMedium
Signaling-plane anomalySS7/Diameter abuse via operator feed (Bastion-X)Network-side trackingCritical
Design philosophy
Detection is about correlation, not individual signals. A single "absent authentication" event might be a flaky real tower. Absent authentication + encryption downgrade + RF fingerprint mismatch + cell 50m from you at -40 dBm = catcher, with very high confidence. Bastion's correlation engine is the intelligence, not the sensors.

Know who's watching.

The signature library is built backwards from known adversary hardware. Each catcher class has a distinctive RF fingerprint footprint, a characteristic signaling behavior, and a typical deployment pattern. Cataloging adversary variants is the research heart of the product.

Tier 1 · Surveillance vendors (adversarial)

NSO · Paragon · Candiru · Gamma

Endpoint implants (Pegasus / Graphite / DevilsTongue / FinSpy) rely on cellular delivery. Bastion detects the associated cellular infrastructure — delivery cells, paging cells, SMS campaign cells — rather than the implants themselves.

Tier 2 · Lawful-intercept vendors (re-deployed)

Septier · R&S · Verint / Cognyte

Legitimate LI kit sold to customers who use it adversarially. Distinctive hardware fingerprints from these vendors form a primary library category.

Tier 3 · State-produced catchers

Chinese GF/PLA · Russian Leer-3

State-manufactured tactical IMSI catchers. Leer-3 is an RB-341V truck-mounted EW/SIGINT system with cellular-catcher payload. Chinese equivalents widely deployed along sensitive borders and for overseas operations.

Tier 4 · Commercial stingray-class

Harris · L3Harris · Gemalto

Law-enforcement-grade catchers, widely proliferated. Not all uses are hostile, but the same devices show up in adversarial hands. Classic fingerprint targets.

Tier 5 · Open source

YateBTS · OpenBTS · srsRAN-based rogues

Attackers increasingly use open-source cellular stacks on commodity SDR hardware (BladeRF, Pluto, USRP). Cheaper to build, harder to fingerprint — but still detectable via protocol-behavior anomalies even when hardware fingerprint is ambiguous.

Tier 6 · One-off / bespoke

Research / boutique builds

Tailored catchers from national labs or specialty shops. Rare, but the highest-threat class — used for highest-value targets. Detectable via protocol anomalies even when the hardware is unknown to the library.

Antenna to alert ladder in under two seconds.

Passive RF capture, baseband DSP, per-standard protocol decoding, three-pipeline detection engine, correlation, alert ladder. All on-device for privacy; only alert metadata and flagged IQ snippets leave for backend library updates.

  ┌──────────────────────── BASTION-S · SIGNAL PATH ───────────────────────┐
                                                                          
      ANTENNAS                                                            
      ┌─────────┐  ┌──────────┐                                           
      │ WIDEBAND│  │ 5G PATCH │  ← polarization-diverse                   
      │ 0.6–3GHz│  │ 3.3–6GHz │     internal to unibody                   
      └────┬────┘  └─────┬────┘                                           
           │              │                                               
      ┌────▼──────────────▼────┐                                          
      │ LNA + FILTER BANK      │ ← SAW filters, 5 cellular bands          
      │ (band-switched)        │                                          
      └────────┬───────────────┘                                          
  
      ┌────────▼─────────┐                                                
      │ SDR · AD9361     │ ← 70 MHz – 6 GHz, 56 MHz IBW, 12-bit           
      │ 2×2 MIMO, 12-bit │                                                
      └────────┬─────────┘                                                
               │  IQ samples (DMA)                                        
      ┌────────▼─────────┐                                                
      │ BASEBAND DSP     │ ← sync, channel est., demod                    
      └───┬────────┬─────┘                                                
          │        │                                                      
     ┌────▼───┐ ┌──▼────────┐ ┌──────────┐                                
     │PROTOCOL│ │RF FINGER- │ │ RAW-IQ   │  ← 24h rolling triage buffer   
     │DECODER │ │PRINT      │ │ BUFFER   │                                
     │GSM·UMTS│ │EXTRACTOR  │ │          │                                
     │LTE·5G  │ │(32-dim)   │ │          │                                
     └────┬───┘ └──┬────────┘ └──────────┘                                
          │        │                                                      
     ┌────▼────────▼────────┐                                             
     │ DETECTION ENGINE     │                                             
     │ rules + ML + baseline│                                             
     │ correlation          │                                             
     └───────────┬──────────┘                                             
  
     ┌───────────▼──────────┐                                             
     │ ALERT LADDER         │ Green · Amber · Red · Critical              
     └───┬──────────────┬───┘                                             
         │              │                                                 
         ▼              ▼                                                 
      HAPTIC           BLE → paired app / earpiece                        
                                                                          
  └────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

                         ▼ (tethered upload)
           ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐
           │  BACKEND — threat-intel + library    │
           │  ├ analyst-reviewed novel anomalies  │
           │  ├ operator fingerprint DB           │
           │  ├ IMSI-catcher variant library      │
           │  └ signed OTA library push to fleet  │
           └──────────────────────────────────────┘

The library would be the product.

Hardware commoditizes in 24 months. The library does not. Two families of signatures form the moat: operator RF fingerprints (what real cells look like at RF, per operator, per region, per vendor) and IMSI-catcher variant library (what known hostile hardware looks like). The former is huge and slow-building; the latter is smaller and evolves weekly as adversary kit is captured, analyzed, or red-teamed.

Source 01

Operator clean captures

Per-operator, per-region captures of real BTS broadcast channels under known-good conditions. Builds the "what real hardware looks like" library. Target: 40+ operators, 200+ regions, multiple BTS vendors per operator. Concept — captures not started.

Source 02

Adversary kit reverse-engineering

Captured adversary catchers, open-source catcher software running on reference SDR hardware (used as controlled red-team targets), and published research papers characterizing specific surveillance vendors' RF signatures.

Source 03

Fleet telemetry (future)

Once Bastion-S is deployed: every anomaly flagged by every device becomes a library input. With 10 K devices pushing telemetry, the library becomes self-improving. This is the disruption economics: incumbents can't match.

Source 04

Partner threat-intel

Access to journalist-protection orgs (Access Now, Citizen Lab, CPJ), academic researchers (SRLabs, Amnesty Security Lab), and allied-government SIGINT feeds (via cleared partnerships). Contributors get priority on derived signatures.

Source 05

Synthetic red-team

Run controlled rogue-BTS deployments in RF-shielded labs; characterize output; feed to library as synthetic adversary variants. Essential for catching novel variants before adversaries deploy them.

Source 06

Continuous refresh

Adversary kit evolves. Library patches pushed on SLA. Target refresh cadence: high-threat regions weekly; stable regions monthly. Subscription-funded operation.

Library status — concept phase
No library entries exist yet. The acquisition strategy is documented and funding-ready; the captures, partnerships, red-team lab, and backend all require Phase 1 funding to begin. Target: 50–150 operator-region pairs by end of Phase 2; 500+ catcher variants by end of Phase 3.

Every real BTS has an imperfection fingerprint.

A real cellular base station is built from production hardware — Huawei BTS3900, Ericsson RBS 6201, Nokia Flexi, ZTE Wireless. Each unit has characteristic RF imperfections that don't show up in the protocol but are measurable in the IQ samples. A rogue base station built from USRP / BladeRF / purpose-built catcher hardware leaves different imperfections. Match vectors against the operator library; mismatches are the single most reliable detection signal.

Feature vector (~32 dimensions)

Carrier Frequency OffsetCrystal stability signature, correlation residual after sync
Sample timing offsetPHY implementation fingerprint from timing recovery
IQ imbalance (gain)Mixer / DAC signature
IQ imbalance (phase)Same
Phase noise envelopeLO quality signature; PSD of residual phase
TX transient (on/off)PA design fingerprint from burst edges
Spectral mask tiltFilter characteristics; PSD slope across channel
EVM constellation patternCalibration fingerprint; error vector distribution
Spurious emissionsOut-of-channel PSD; hardware quirks
Intermodulation productsPA non-linearity signature

Why this works against catchers

A Huawei BTS3900 and a HackRF running OpenBTS have vastly different imperfection profiles — different crystals, different mixers, different PAs, different filters. Even when the catcher correctly impersonates an operator at the protocol layer, the underlying hardware leaves tells at the analog layer.

Research basis: Rajendran et al. (SenSys 2019), Sankhe et al. (INFOCOM 2019), the ORACLE/DIRECTION work, Princeton RFEye papers. Production-grade RF fingerprinting moved from research to viable product only in 2022–2024.

Operational thresholding
Match distance between captured fingerprint and closest library entry. Within threshold: operator-confidence high (>95%). Outside threshold: unknown-hardware flag raised. Thresholds tuned per region based on library maturity.

Illustrative. No system built yet. This is the mission we would solve.

A journalist meets a sensitive source in Istanbul. The local intelligence service has an interest. The meeting venue is a café on a busy street — legitimate cells everywhere, any of which could be cloned.

// Illustrative (not real) Bastion-S session · sample mission T-24h Bastion-S paired with journalist's phone. Controller downloads Turkey regional threat-intel (operator fingerprint library for Turkcell / Vodafone TR / Türk Telekom, known-variant catchers observed in Istanbul sector). Baseline-learning engages; records normal cells at apartment, commute route, known-safe locations. T-0 Journalist arrives at meeting café. Passive monitoring (battery ≈ 71% remaining). T+15m ANOMALY DETECTED — · new cell at RSSI -40 dBm (too strong; real towers >100m) · operator claim: Turkcell (PLMN 28601), ARFCN 1800 · RF fingerprint mismatch: observed CFO, phase-noise, IQ-imbalance vector outside Turkcell regional library (distance 8.3σ) · neighbor-cell list: 1 entry (expected 8–11 for urban Istanbul) · authentication absent on observed UE attach · encryption advertised: A5/0 (null cipher) · baseline-learning: unseen cell at this location Correlation weight: 4.6 / 5.0 → RED state Nearest adversary-library match: Septier-family variant · 87% confidence T+15m+1s HAPTIC ALERT (silent vibration to BLE earpiece) "IMSI catcher detected. ~50m bearing 120°. Septier-family variant. Do not transmit sensitive info. Relocate." T+15m+2s Controller auto-actions (configurable): · paired phone → airplane mode · messaging apps → paused · recording app → silent buffer begins (local only) T+post Journalist wraps up small talk, leaves. Raw IQ snippet (pre-alert + 30s post) uploads encrypted to backend. Analyst queue: novel variant flagged for review. Library update: operator library refined for this Istanbul sector; next user in the region gets the improved signature on next sync. // No sensitive information transmitted on the compromised network. // Adversary catcher identified, bearing known, variant catalogued.
What the protected person actually experiences
Silent vibration. A single sentence on an earpiece. A phone that quietly goes to airplane mode. No alarm, no siren, no spectacle. The adversary never knows they were detected.

Nine segments. All underserved today.

Bastion's buyer base is broad because the threat is broad. What these segments share: high-value individuals or sites, credible cellular-surveillance exposure, and no incumbent vendor serving their price band.

SegmentBuyerTypical ACVSales motion
Journalist protectionCPJ, RSF, major media orgs$5–50K / yr / reporter bundlePost-Pegasus urgency; NGO grants
Executive protectionEP firms, corporate CISOs$50–500K / siteEnterprise sales via EP vendor channel
Diplomatic / embassyMFAs, embassies, consulates$100K–2M / siteGovernment procurement
SOF / case officerTier-1 SOF, national intelClassifiedDirect-to-agency; cleared channel
HNW family officeFamily offices, private security$30–100K / familyReferral network; private security integrator
Political campaignCampaign security (post-Pegasus world)$20–100K / campaignCyclical; election-cycle spikes
Human rights defenderNGOs, donors (OSF, Ford, MacArthur)Subsidized / at-costMission-driven; grant-funded
Law firm M&A / arbitrationBig-law partners, arbitration firms$50–200K / war-roomB2B via firm general counsel
Corporate counterintelligenceFortune 500 CISOs$50–300K / programEnterprise; multi-year

The adversary adapts. So does the library.

Catchers evolve. Adversaries retune hardware, rotate software, update protocols. Library refresh cadence is the product's operational promise. A library six months stale is a library that's being defeated in the field. This is why the subscription model is the actual business — not the hardware.

Adversary pattern 01

Hardware replacement

Vendor ships new SKU; RF fingerprint shifts. Detected at our red-team lab or via fleet telemetry. New library entry within 2–4 weeks.

Adversary pattern 02

Protocol re-tuning

Catcher software adjusts neighbor-cell lists, authentication behavior, encryption advertisement to mimic real operator more closely. Detection rules updated; weights rebalanced.

Adversary pattern 03

Detection evasion

Adversary learns Bastion exists; designs specifically to evade it. Mitigations: multiple detection pipelines (hardware fingerprint + protocol + baseline anomaly), so evading one still trips others.

The disruption economics of the library
With 10K+ deployed devices pushing anomaly telemetry, Bastion's library is continuously current. Enterprise vendors (Delma, R&S) ship annual firmware updates. Average lag: 11 months. Adversary evolution cycle: 1–3 months. This is the structural edge a fleet-telemetry business has over a box-sale business.

A captured device yields nothing.

Bastion devices are carried by high-threat individuals. Device capture is a realistic scenario. Every design decision assumes the device will eventually be in adversary hands.

Defense 01

Secure-boot chain

ROM → signed SPL → signed U-Boot → signed kernel → dm-verity rootfs. Keys sealed in ATECC608B secure element. No unsigned firmware accepted ever.

Defense 02

Crypto-shred on tamper

Accelerometer threshold + capacitive breach sensor + thermal anomaly → zero out keys, zero out library, scrub volatile memory. <100 ms from trigger to inoperability.

Defense 03

Library segmentation

Each device carries only the signatures relevant to its threat-intel region. Capturing one device exposes a regional subset, not the global library.

Defense 04

Encrypted at rest

LUKS + dm-verity; library in HSM-sealed volume. Physical extraction of storage yields ciphertext without the keys-in-ATECC608 the device destroys on tamper.

Defense 05

No user-extractable secrets

Protected person never holds library keys. No passphrase can unlock forensic mode. Recovery is factory-re-flash, period.

Defense 06

Cover enclosures

Planned variants: magnetic-case-clipped-to-phone, notebook-insert, power-bank lookalike. Reduces visual signature in hostile contexts.

A barbell market. Nothing in the middle, where the buyers are.

Cellular counter-surveillance has two existing ends: enterprise ($500K+ Delma, Airbus, R&S) and consumer (free: EFF Crocodile Hunter, SnoopSnitch, Amnesty MVT). Between them — pocket-size professional-grade devices at $2–10K — there is nothing. That's where Bastion lives.

2021+ Pegasus era. Demand for personal cellular counter-surveillance spiked 8× among protected-person segments. Product supply has not caught up.
2020+ Technical viability. Commodity SDR + edge ML + RF fingerprinting became productizable. Before 2020 you couldn't build a pocket device at commodity cost.
2022+ Regulatory clarity. EU PEGA Committee, UN Special Rapporteur, FTC frameworks explicitly legitimize defensive cellular tools for civilians.
structural Innovator's dilemma. Incumbents structured for $500K+ enterprise deals literally cannot profitably sell $3K devices. They can't follow us down.
The barbell — why nothing exists in the middle
Enterprise: R&S, Delma, Airbus — built for multi-month sales cycles, cleared personnel, on-site installation, $500K+ deals. Cannot downmarket without dismantling their cost structure.

Consumer: EFF, SRLabs, Amnesty — academic or volunteer engineering; no commercial-grade reliability, support, backend, or distribution. Cannot upmarket without becoming commercial companies, which most explicitly don't want.

The middle — the actual buyers, at $2–10K / year per device, paying for reliability and subscription intelligence — is empty.

Nobody does what Bastion would do.

System Form Price Library refresh RF-fingerprint 5G SA
Delma (IL)Enterprise rack$500K+annuallimitedpartial
Airbus SLCEnterprise platform$1M+annualnopartial
Rohde & SchwarzMil-grade / briefcase$200K+manuallimitedpartial
SeptierEnterprise$500K+annuallimitedpartial
GSMK CryptoPhoneSecure-phone (prevention)$3K / phonen/anono
CellebriteForensics$$$n/anono
SnoopSnitchAndroid appfreerarenono
EFF Crocodile HunterResearcher toolfreevolunteernono
SRLabs DarshakResearcher toolfreevolunteernono
Amnesty MVTForensics onlyfreen/anono
BASTION (concept)Pocket · Vehicle · Site$2–100Kcontinuous (subscription)yes · primaryyes (target)
Market positioning
There is no competitor in the pocket-size, pro-grade, subscription-refreshed, RF-fingerprint-primary quadrant. The category is wide open. Incumbents can't profitably downmarket; researcher tools can't practically upmarket. This is a classic disruption-from-below opening.

Don't attack the top. Disrupt from below.

Competing head-on with Delma, Airbus, or R&S in the enterprise market would fail. Their incumbency is 10+ years deep; their certifications are a 3–5 year moat; their export channels are pre-cleared; their procurement relationships are entrenched. A Bulgarian concept-stage startup cannot displace that on day one. The strategy is sequential.

Phase 1 · Y1–Y3

Underserved segment

NGOs · journalists · EP firms · HNW family offices · individual C-suite executives · HRDs · small diplomatic missions. Incumbents literally won't sell here — deal sizes are too small for their cost structure. We own them by default.

Phase 2 · Y3–Y5

Mid-market expansion

Accumulated references, case studies, library maturity, first certifications. Move up to mid-size EP firms, corporate CISOs, regional government agencies, small embassies. R&S is too expensive for them; SnoopSnitch is not serious enough. Bastion fits.

Phase 3 · Y5+

Enterprise disruption

Armed with 10K+ deployed devices and 5 years of real-world threat-intel, show up in enterprise RFPs against R&S. Value prop: "Our library is continuously updated from 10,000 active sensors. Yours ships annually. Here's what we caught this month that your firmware missed."

The precedent
Salesforce beat Siebel. Dropbox beat enterprise file servers. Zoom beat WebEx. Tesla beat BMW. In every case, the disruptor entered at the bottom where the incumbents were structurally unable to follow, and built up to attack enterprise from beneath.

Three products. One counter-ISR doctrine.

Bastion completes the Nexus Atlas counter-ISR family. Each product addresses a different layer of the adversary's intelligence cycle; together they form a closed loop with a shared signature-library moat.

Airborne detection

Blackbird

Small autonomous drone. Flies out, finds adversary RF emitters (drones, radars, datalinks) in contested airspace, returns a target list. "Hunt the hunters."

RF deception

Phantom

Distributed ground emitter swarm. Emits library replicas of high-value targets. Adversary SIGINT cycles waste themselves on empty positions. "Let them shoot where you are not."

Cellular counter-surveillance

Bastion

Personal / vehicle / fixed-site cellular monitor. Detects adversary intercept gear targeting you or your asset. "They're listening. We tell you when, from where, and what to do about it."

  ┌──────────────── NEXUS ATLAS COUNTER-ISR FAMILY · CLOSED LOOP ────────┐
                                                                        
         BLACKBIRD                 PHANTOM                BASTION       
      (airborne detect)         (RF deception)       (cellular detect)  
             │                       │                        │           
             ▼                       ▼                        ▼           
       adversary drones          adversary SIGINT          hostile cellular 
       + radar emitters          cycle corrupted          intercept gear   
             │                       │                        │           
             └──────── shared library moat ───────────────────┘           
                    operator + adversary                                
                    RF fingerprint database                             
                                                                        
         ┌── Bastion detects hostile catcher ──────────┐                 
         │  → target emitter added to Blackbird list   │                 
         │  → Phantom can fake cellular if desired     │                 
         └──────────────────────────────────────────────┘                 
                                                                        
  └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Counter-surveillance, not interception.

The single most important strategic point about Bastion: it sells as counter-surveillance equipment, not interception equipment. This is a clean ECCN 5.A.1 counter-surveillance category — not on the EU Dual-Use 2021/821 Annex I 5.A.1.f interception list.

Regulatory category

ECCN 5.A.1 counter-surveillance

Routinely licensed for EU / NATO / allied customers. Not on interception / lawful-intercept lists. Wassenaar cat 5.A.1 counter-surveillance goods — standard export.

Post-Pegasus framework

EU + UN legitimization

EU PEGA Committee (2023) explicitly endorsed defensive cellular-security tools for civilians. UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression (2023) called for such tools. FTC / state AG frameworks put defensive tools on clean footing.

Brand positioning

Counter-SIGINT, not surveillance

Zero NSO-class contamination risk. Acquirable by legitimate acquirers (Cognyte, Palantir, Anduril, L3Harris, major primes). Investable by defense-specialist funds. Sellable to NGOs and governments alike.

What we don't sell

Never interception

Bastion cannot be configured to intercept cellular content. No active mode. No silent-attach. No rogue-BTS emulation. The product physically lacks the capability — by design, for regulatory and reputational cleanliness.

Concept phase. Pre-prototype. Idea presented for partner interest.

Bastion is currently a concept being presented for early partner interest. Nothing is built or deployed. The roadmap below is what we would execute, given funding and partnership.

Phase 1 · planned

Bench prototype

~6 months from kickoff
  • HackRF / BladeRF + Raspberry Pi bench build
  • srsRAN + Osmocom detection stack
  • ~200 operator-region fingerprint captures in Sofia
  • Rule-based detector validated on known-good + red-team catcher targets
  • First conversations: CPJ / Access Now / journalist org partners
Phase 2 · planned

Reference hardware

~6–12 months after Phase 1
  • AD9361 + i.MX 8M Plus custom carrier board
  • Port detection stack to embedded Linux
  • RF fingerprinting pipeline (research → production)
  • Library to 500–1,000 operator-region pairs
  • First red-team assessment (external)
Phase 3 · planned

Bastion-S pre-prototype

~6–12 months after Phase 2
  • First custom industrial design + enclosure
  • Integration testing against YateBTS/OpenBTS targets
  • ATECC608 + tamper chain
  • First 50 pre-production units · closed partner deployment
  • Controller/SOC v1.0
Phase 4 · planned

First production batch

~12–18 months after Phase 3
  • First production run (volumes driven by partner demand)
  • Library refresh subscription live
  • Bastion-V variant enters design
  • FIPS 140-3 submission
  • NGO / EP firm / journalist-org pilots at scale
Technology readiness
TRL 1–2 Bastion today: concept phase. Basic principles observed, technology concept formulated. Nothing built.
TRL 4–5 Target after Phase 1–2: component validation in lab and relevant environment.
TRL 6–7 Target after Phase 3–4: system prototype demonstrated in relevant and operational environments.
What this page is
This page describes a concept. Nothing here is built, shipped, deployed, or for sale. We're presenting the idea for partner interest — funding partners, EP / NGO / media pilot partners, cellular-security research collaborators, manufacturing partners.

If the concept resonates, reach out via Nexus Atlas channels. We'll treat your interest with the same tradecraft discipline we built into the product.