See who sees you. Automated surveillance detection for cities, routes, and protectees.
Intelligence officers, diplomats, judges and witnesses move through cities saturated with cameras. Hostile services also move through those cities — in cars, in pairs, in floating boxes — following the people they want to compromise, coerce, or harm. The tradecraft for detecting a tail is called a Surveillance Detection Route, and it has existed for 80 years. It is manual, expensive, and does not scale. Backtrack automates it. Public and ministerial cameras along a pre-registered SDR corridor are fused into one co-travel engine. Every vehicle that hits enough of your chokepoints, too close to your run, is scored. Every score comes with the evidence trail. Your officer gets the call before the adversary does.
Surveillance is a pipeline. Every stage leaks.
A hostile intelligence or organized-crime surveillance operation is not a single car in the rear-view mirror. It is a pipeline of teams, vehicles and observation posts — trained to swap positions, change plates, fall back, leapfrog parallel streets, and pre-position at your likely destinations. Ukraine 2014–2025 and the Mexican cartels' counter-surveillance doctrine are the two richest contemporary case-libraries; the tradecraft itself dates to Cold War Berlin and Moscow. Every stage of the pipeline leaves a trace on the city's camera fabric. Without an engine to fuse it, those traces die in siloed DVRs. Backtrack is that engine.
Floating-box surveillance
Trained hostile services run 4–8 vehicle packages that rotate positions every 2–4 minutes. No single vehicle stays behind the target long enough to be obvious. Radio or encrypted-data traffic keeps the box coherent. Pattern: at least one member of the set is always within sight of the target.
- Operator training ~12 months · FSB / GRU / Mossad / Cartel patterns documented
- Typical set size: 4 static + 4 mobile · larger for dignitaries
- Defeats one-car tail-check entirely · requires set-level analytic
Stakeout and dead drops
The most skilled surveillance doesn't follow — it waits. Vehicles or pedestrians are pre-staged at likely departure points, transit nodes, and destinations. They appear at the camera 10–30 minutes before the target passes, every day, for weeks. Invisible to a one-shot SDR. Visible to a pattern-of-life baseline.
- Used heavily in recruitment / contact surveillance
- Classic Cold War Moscow and Berlin craft; modern against defectors
- Only baseline-deviation analytics catch it · raw plate-read correlation misses it
Plate swaps & clean vehicles
A professional team does not use one vehicle for a full surveillance cycle. Plates are swapped in garages, vehicles are rotated out of country-specific registries, and clean rentals are staged. Naive ALPR fingerprinting fails here. Vehicle visual re-identification — make, model, color, mods, roof, antenna, dents — survives plate changes.
- Plate change typical every 48–96 hours in active operation
- Re-ID from CCTV has matured; 10–20 cm resolution now commodity
- Visual ID + plate ID disagreement is itself a red flag
Every service protecting field officers, every close-protection detail for dignitaries, judges and witnesses, and every counter-terrorism unit tracking pre-attack surveillance faces the same structural problem: the signal is in the city's cameras, but nobody is fusing it in time to matter. Backtrack fuses it.
Backtrack is not an ALPR vendor. It is tradecraft in a binary.
Four tradecraft principles guide every design decision. An ALPR vendor sells you plate reads. A correlation vendor sells you dashboards. Backtrack sells you an automated surveillance-detection officer — something that understands what an SDR is for, why static OPs matter, why one plate on three unlikely cameras is signal and ten plates on one boulevard is noise. The craft is older than the code.
Design the route so the city filters your tail for you.
A good SDR is not a random walk. It is a sequence of chokepoints — intersections, one-way cuts, detour loops, unnatural turns — that no honest citizen has a reason to traverse in that sequence. Any vehicle that appears at three of them in a row inside your run window is statistically impossible as a neighbor. The SDR does the filtering; Backtrack does the counting.
- Chokepoint entropy scored against baseline traffic before a route is approved
- Loss drills and abort points pre-planned for every run
- Route never used twice in the same week — no adversary baseline on our pattern
One plate, three unlikely cameras, inside the window.
The core analytic is brutally simple: for each candidate plate X, what fraction of the protectee's chokepoints did X also appear at, within time window T of the protectee's own passage? The city's baseline rate tells you how rare that hit-pattern is. A 4-of-5 hit with a background rate of 0.001 is evidence, not coincidence. The math is classical. The novelty is doing it fast enough to matter in-mission.
- Hypergeometric test gives a calibrated p-value, not a made-up score
- Score decomposes cleanly — every point traces to a camera-timestamp pair
- Operator always sees why, not just what
Normality is the model. Deviation is the signal.
Raw co-travel misses the most important class of hostile surveillance: the one that doesn't follow. A vehicle that appears near the protectee's residence 20 minutes before departure every day, for three weeks, without ever following, is pre-positioning. A vehicle that appears at a destination camera 10 minutes before the protectee arrives, repeatedly, is terminal surveillance. Pattern-of-life baselines — per camera, per time-of-day, per day-of-week — are the only way to flag these.
- Rolling PoL baseline per camera, 60 days, Bayesian update
- Deviation scored in standard deviations against a temporal bucket
- Flag + evidence package delivered asynchronously; this is not a live-run analytic
The vehicle is the identity, not the plate.
Professional surveillance swaps plates. Backtrack treats a plate as one fingerprint among many: a visual fingerprint (make, model, color, body-panel signature, roof rack, antenna, dent pattern) is co-indexed against the plate. When the plate fingerprint and the visual fingerprint diverge, the divergence itself is a red flag — it is exactly what a plate swap looks like.
- Vehicle re-ID CV model co-trained with plate read · shared feature bank
- Plate/visual mismatch escalated to analyst, not flagged as noise
- No face recognition · no pedestrian re-ID · this is a vehicle system by design
The city is already watching. Nobody is asking the right question of the footage.
The question is not "what vehicles passed this camera." The question is "which vehicles passed our cameras, in our window, more than chance allows." Backtrack asks it.
One map. Every camera. Every plate. Four detectors. One score.
At the unit level: a correlation service plus a fleet of edge ALPR + re-ID nodes installed at ministerial, municipal and transit camera feeds, plus a hardened operator app on a vehicle tablet and a command console for the surveillance-detection coordinator. At the system level: a real-time graph over the city's camera fabric that answers one question — who is co-travelling with the protectee right now, and how unlikely is that? — and delivers the answer, with evidence, before the run is over.
┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ BACKTRACK · SDR RUN ECHO-9 · T+18:42 │
│ │
│ ┌──────────┐ ◎ Protectee CA 8421 AK │
│ │ Edge │──── plate: CA 3847 PR │
│ │ ALPR │ reid: black SUV · roof rack │
│ │ N=120 │ score: 4/5 chokepoints │
│ └────┬─────┘ │
│ │ ┌───────────┐ │
│ ┌────▼────┐ │ Correlate │ │
│ │ Graph │──│ P = 2e-6 │ → SCORE 91 │
│ │ engine │ │ α = 0.01 │ │
│ └────┬────┘ └───────────┘ │
│ │ │
│ ┌────▼────┐ ┌──────────┐ │
│ │ Evid │ ──────► │ Operator │ TABLET │
│ │ trail │ │ tablet │ │
│ └─────────┘ └──────────┘ │
│ │
│ transport: Nexus Atlas · bonded LTE/mesh/SAT │
└───────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
The unit is the city graph.
A Backtrack edge node by itself is just another ALPR. The product is the graph: every registered SDR becomes an edge query, every chokepoint a vertex, every candidate plate a walk. You do not deploy Backtrack per officer. You deploy it per city, and every protective detail and every CI field team shares the same graph, scoped by protectee.
- Typical city deployment1 corr. node · 80–400 cameras
- Camera feed ingestRTSP · ONVIF · H.264/H.265
- Plate reads per sec (design)~800 per correlation node
- Re-ID embeddings per sec~120 per correlation node
- SDR runs concurrentup to 40 · typical 4–8
- Raw retention default72 h · judicial hold extends
- Evidence packetsigned · tamper-evident · auditable
- Operator appAndroid + GrapheneOS · offline-first
Five phases. Minutes, not days.
A Backtrack run is a pre-authorized, time-bounded, scope-limited query against the city camera graph. Authorization is explicit (the protectee's controlling service), scope is narrow (only the run's corridor and window), purpose is declared (counter-surveillance for the named protectee), and every query is logged immutably for the inspector general. The system is useless without this envelope — legally, operationally, and ethically.
Four tiers. Every one runs on-prem or on bonded transport.
Backtrack runs on Nexus Atlas as its transport fabric. That matters: the operator tablet must work in a parking garage, on an underpass, under cover of a dense urban RF environment, or when the adversary is actively jamming LTE. Bonded LTE + mesh + SAT means the alert arrives on whichever path survives. No cloud dependency, no vendor phone-home, no plate read ever leaves the customer's legal jurisdiction unless the customer explicitly pushes it.
Tier 01 · Camera & sensor layer
Existing municipal, ministerial and transit cameras. Where resolution or angle are inadequate, Backtrack ships optional uplift cameras — but the point of the product is reuse, not roll-out. Cameras stream RTSP to the nearest edge node. No modification to camera firmware.
- Typical camera typesfixed PTZ · ANPR-purpose · transit
- StreamRTSP · ONVIF · H.264/H.265
- Resolution target1080p @ 25 fps · plate at ≥80 px wide
- Health checkcontinuous · dead-camera flag in 30 s
Tier 02 · Edge inference
Ruggedized edge nodes at the police precinct, transit hub, or ministry wiring closet. ARM SoC + NPU. Handles 8–16 concurrent 1080p feeds per node. Runs ALPR, vehicle re-ID, and per-camera pattern-of-life counters locally. Only embeddings and plate hashes leave the edge — raw footage stays on the camera's own retention policy.
- Inference hardwareNPU · 8 TOPS target
- Models on edgeALPR · re-ID · PoL counter
- Outboundplate hash · embedding · timestamp
- No raw footage leaves nodeby design · auditable
Tier 03 · Correlation engine
The brain. Hot/hot pair, on-prem in a ministry data centre or sovereign private cloud. Maintains the live graph for every active SDR run, the pattern-of-life baseline for every camera, and the four detector pipelines. Provides the operator console, the signed-alert API, and the inspector-general audit stream.
- Deploymenton-prem · sovereign cloud only
- Concurrent SDRsup to 40 · typical 4–8
- Graph enginetemporal · sliding-window p-value
- Retention72 h default · judicial hold to 24 mo
Tier 04 · Operator & console
Field officer carries a hardened Android tablet (GrapheneOS) + earpiece. SD coordinator runs a desktop console with the full city graph, analyst review queues, and the audit stream. Protective detail leads get a lighter mobile variant. Every surface authenticates through the ministry's own PKI — no third-party IdP in the path.
- Officer appAndroid · GrapheneOS · offline-first
- TransportNexus Atlas · LTE + mesh + SAT bonded
- Authministry PKI · hardware-bound key
- Alert pathvoice · tablet card · map overlay
Tier 01 · Cameras Tier 02 · Edge Tier 03 · Correlation Tier 04 · Operator
┌──────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐
│ MoI PTZ │ RTSP │ Edge node A │ plate + │ Graph engine │ NXA │ Field tablet │
│ transit ANPR │ ──────────► │ 8 feeds · NPU │ ────────► │ 4 detectors, hot/hot │ ────► │ alert · map │
│ municipal fixed │ │ ALPR · re-ID · P │ embed │ PoL baselines │ │ loss drills │
└──────────────────┘ └──────────────────┘ └──────────────────────┘ └──────────────────┘
▲ ▲ │ ▲
│ │ │ │
└── camera feed stays on └── only hashes & embeddings └── signed evidence ──────────┘
camera's own retention leave the edge packet + IG audit stream
Bonded multipath by default
LTE + mesh + SAT are bonded at the transport layer. Operator tablet doesn't know or care which path carries the alert. Underpasses, parking garages, active jamming — pick the path that's up. The Atlas fabric is the reason this concept is co-located with Phantom, Blackbird and Bastion.
No data leaves the jurisdiction
Every plate read, every embedding, every audit entry stays inside the customer's legal perimeter. Vendor has no remote access. Models are trained on approved footage in-country. Default deployment in EU is GDPR + LED 2016/680 compliant by construction.
Every query is logged, immutably
Each SDR run, each analyst query, each evidence retrieval is written to an append-only audit stream that the inspector general can review. Tamper-evident. Un-deletable by the operators themselves. An abuse attempt leaves fingerprints.
One score. Four orthogonal evidence sources.
A professional surveillance package defeats any single detector on its own. Co-travel misses the floating box. Floating-box misses the static OP. Static-OP misses the plate-swapped clean vehicle. Four detectors run in parallel and their scores fuse by calibrated p-value combination. A hit on two is evidence; a hit on three is a call. Every point of every score traces to a camera-timestamp pair — the score is not a black box.
Score fusion
Each detector emits a calibrated p-value under its null. Fused using Fisher's combined probability test, with correction for non-independence when detectors share evidence (co-travel and set-level share chokepoint hits). Threshold defaults to p < 10⁻⁴; tunable per mission criticality. The score shown to the operator is 0–100 mapped from log-p, for readability, but the underlying decision is always on the calibrated p-value.
Plates lie. Vehicles don't — not as easily.
A plate is a string. A vehicle is a fingerprint: make, model, color, body-panel signature, wheels, roof rack, antenna mount, sunroof, dent pattern, aftermarket bumper. The same vehicle moving through different cameras produces similar embeddings from a re-ID model even when the plate has changed. Backtrack co-indexes plate reads with re-ID embeddings. A plate with no matching visual, or a visual with no matching plate, is itself a red flag — and it is exactly what a professional plate swap looks like.
What the model outputs
- Typesedan · SUV · van · hatch · pickup · bus
- Make / modeltop-1 + top-3 · confidence
- Color11-class · matte / metallic · daylight-corrected
- Distinguishing featuresroof rack · antenna · tow hitch · dent
- Visual fingerprint512-D embedding · FAISS-indexed
- Plate + visual coherencejoint score · mismatch flagged
Example: a plate-swap operation
08:42 NODE-12 plate KN 9102 VT visual: silver VW Passat 09:14 NODE-18 plate KN 9102 VT visual: silver VW Passat 11:02 NODE-03 plate KN 9102 VT visual: black SUV ← mismatch 11:47 NODE-07 plate KN 9102 VT visual: black SUV 13:18 NODE-14 plate CA 3847 PR visual: black SUV ← swap complete 14:02 NODE-22 plate CA 3847 PR visual: black SUV
One vehicle, two plates, in the same day. Neither plate query alone would have caught it. The re-ID embedding is the constant — and the moment of mismatch is a diagnostic signal all on its own.
What the fingerprint actually contains
Vehicle re-ID is not a single embedding — it is a composite of seven attribute families, each independently scored and independently checkable by an analyst. "Same vehicle" is an argument with thirty lines of evidence, not a single cosine distance. Each attribute contributes 1–10 bits of identifying information; across 20+ attributes you reach 40–60 bits — enough to pick out one vehicle from a city of 500K. That is the evidential math behind every re-ID call.
Vehicle taxonomy
Sedan · SUV · MPV · van (cargo vs passenger) · pickup · hatch · coupe · bus · motorcycle · bicycle · scooter. Year-range estimation via facelift detection — e.g. Audi A6 C7 vs C8 is a measurable three-year delta.
Who built it, in which spec
Top-1 and top-3 over ~200 EU-market models. Trim packages where visible: S-line, M-Sport, AMG, sport bumpers, chrome accents. Cross-market variant flag (Opel = Vauxhall = Buick — same silhouette, different registries).
Paint as a fingerprint
11-class base + finish channel (metallic · matte · pearl · wrap). Two-tone detection. Per-camera lighting calibration so sodium-vapor vs LED streetlight shift does not flip the classifier. Wrap-vs-paint discrimination — a wrap in a CI context is itself a flag.
Survives plate swaps
Roof rack · ski box · bike rack. Antenna type (OEM shark fin vs aftermarket whip vs multi-element — surveillance and ex-service vehicles often retain whips). Tow hitch + electrical socket. Sunroof. Tint class. Front-plate presence. Wheel class (alloy vs steel). Aftermarket bumpers / brush guards.
The best fingerprint
Dent patterns per-panel, per-side. Paint chips, primer spots, color-mismatched repaired panels. Rust patches (wheel arch, door bottom, tailgate). Broken · cracked · taped lamp assemblies. Folded mirror. Curb-rash on specific wheel rims. Highly unique, very persistent — a vehicle keeps its scars.
Night-time make/model cue
OEM vs aftermarket HID/LED conversion (color temperature is measurable — 3200K halogen vs 5500K+ LED shifts pixel chromaticity predictably). DRL shape — highly model-specific, often the best make/model cue at night when badging is invisible. Fog-light presence. Lamp-out flags (one headlight out is common, unique, persistent).
Movement as signal
Suspension sag (loaded trunk — possibly equipment weight). Alignment pull or wander (hard-used fleet vehicle). Exhaust smoke pattern (diesel vs petrol; black = rich, blue = oil burner — classic unmarked-surveillance-fleet maintenance signature). Engine-running-while-parked detection. Window dew/fog pattern (someone inside in cold weather).
~40–60 bits of identity
Sum of per-attribute agreements. Each independently checkable by an analyst. "Same make, same color, same roof rack, same curb-rash on right-front wheel, same cracked LH tail-light, same rear-bumper scrape, same steel wheels" is an argument a prosecutor can make to a judge — it is not a single black-box similarity score.
Analyst-only cues · surveillance-vehicle tells
Some observable signals are too weak or too context-dependent to auto-score, but they matter to an experienced analyst. Backtrack surfaces them as evidence rows in the review queue — never as live alerts — so the human call is informed without the automation over-reaching. Operators train against this list; the system records it.
- Extra antenna arrays or multiple antenna types on one vehicle
- "Wedged for fast departure" parking posture (nose-out of a parallel space)
- Two occupants in a parked vehicle who do not exit
- Engine running while parked (visible exhaust vapor, slight vibration)
- Aftermarket dashcam visible in the windshield, front or rear
- Tinted front-side windows but plain rear (mis-matched aftermarket job)
- Front plate missing in a jurisdiction that requires one
- Commercial livery that does not match the business registry
- Diplomatic-plate prefix on a vehicle whose visual fingerprint recently matched a non-diplomatic plate
- Wrap color that does not match the registered paint code for the VIN
Core re-ID is a vehicle system. Faces are not in the product. Pedestrians are a walled-off extension.
Face recognition is never part of any Backtrack configuration. Vehicle re-ID in the core is a legitimate, scoped, proportionate tool for the counter-surveillance mission. Pedestrian whole-body re-ID is the separately licensed Backtrack-Foot extension (§12), with stricter constraints than the core because it is biometric data under LED Article 10.
Normality has a shape. Surveillance breaks that shape.
For every camera on the network, Backtrack maintains a rolling 60-day baseline of who appears there, at what hours, on what days, with what vehicle class. The baseline is a probability distribution, not a whitelist — no vehicle is "known-good," only known-typical. When a specific plate or visual fingerprint appears at a camera at a time it almost never appears, the deviation is measured in standard deviations and scored against the protectee's movement. Pre-positioning surveillance, which ignores the target's movement and waits for it, lights up only on this detector.
Per-camera, per-bucket distribution
Each camera has a joint distribution over (plate-bucket, time-of-day, day-of-week, vehicle class). Bucket, not per-plate, so the baseline itself is not a dossier — it is a frequency table. Rolling 60-day window, Bayesian update, decays cleanly.
Deviation in σ, scored against the run
A plate appearing at a protectee chokepoint at 05:12 Mon, when the baseline probability of any vehicle of its class being there at that time is below 0.001, is a 3σ+ deviation. Deviation is meaningful only in conjunction with the SDR run — on its own it is noise.
Asynchronous, analyst-fed
PoL detection is slower than co-travel and typically runs asynchronously — its outputs feed the analyst review queue, not the officer's earpiece. It is how you catch the surveillance that has been watching for two weeks and hasn't followed once.
What a pre-positioning event looks like
Where PoL is weak — and why that's fine
Pattern-of-life is easy to poison if the adversary knows the camera set and the bucket structure. A surveillance operation that varies its approach time deliberately will not accumulate enough signal to deviate. Which is why Backtrack does not publish its bucket structure and which is why the SD coordinator rotates chokepoint selection between runs. But the moment the adversary has to vary approach time, their own OP becomes more expensive to maintain — and that's a win the system delivers even when it fails to flag.
- Poisoning an entire city's PoL baseline is not practical for any real adversary
- A forced shift to highly random approach timing is itself operationally costly for the adversary
- PoL is one of four detectors · the others do not share its weaknesses
The officer is driving. The alert is a sentence.
An operator tablet that demands reading while the officer is negotiating a turn is a liability, not a tool. Backtrack's alert path is voice-first (ear-piece TTS with a fixed phraseology), tablet-second (map overlay + evidence card), and console-third (full graph at the SD coordinator's desk). The officer gets a sentence. The coordinator gets the forensics. Both surface the same evidence packet so no two people in the loop see a different picture.
The earpiece sentence
The sentence has a fixed format: name · score · candidate · coverage · recommendation. Operators learn it in 10 minutes. Cognitive load during a high-speed drive is minimized by prior training, not by hoping the driver's attention lands where we need it.
The tablet card
Every alert carries its full evidence. The operator can defend the call.
"The system flagged it" is not an acceptable explanation to a chain of command or a court. Backtrack's alerts decompose into the specific camera frames, timestamps, re-ID embeddings, and PoL deviations that drove them. The officer acts on a sentence — the coordinator defends the call with the forensics.
Your own PPD looks exactly like a tail.
Most of the vehicles that will appear to be tailing a protectee, in any realistic deployment, are friendly — the same ministry's protective detail, allied-service liaison, sometimes another department's surveillance of an entirely different target who happens to share a corridor. A Backtrack that flags them all is worse than useless: it will be ignored within a week, and it will leak operational information about who-is-protected-when to anyone inside who queries the log. Deconfliction is the core operational problem, not an afterthought.
Scoped, compartmented allow-lists
Each protectee has an allow-list scoped to their service. PPD lead is allow-listed on their protectee's runs only. Liaison services' plates are allow-listed per-mission, not globally. An allow-list entry is a signed capability, not a database row; it can be revoked and carries its own audit trail. Nobody has a "master list" of all friendly vehicles across all services — and that is deliberate.
Inter-service deconfliction as a protocol
When two friendly services happen to run surveillance-detection in the same corridor, they do not merge their allow-lists — they deconflict through a minimal protocol: "vehicle set A is mine for window W; please do not flag." The protocol reveals nothing about either service's target or purpose. Compartmentation is preserved.
Known non-threats (courier, taxi, delivery)
Registered taxi, courier, delivery and public-transit fleets are identified by fleet plate pattern and allow-listed at a lower priority tier. Their co-travel hits still score — a courier van following the protectee across three unlikely chokepoints still matters — but their hits are weighted against a distinct baseline that knows their typical behavior.
Analyst review for marginal cases
Anything in the 60–85 score band is sent to analyst queue rather than the officer's earpiece. The analyst has the graph, the PoL history, and context the automation does not. Calls become confident or dismissed with analyst signoff, feeding back as labeled data for threshold tuning.
This is how the system stays legal. And how we stay the good guys.
A real-time fusion engine over a city's cameras is, in the wrong configuration, exactly the mass-surveillance infrastructure we refuse to build. The differentiators that keep Backtrack a legitimate counter-surveillance tool rather than a regime-accessory are not optional features — they are how it's architected at the schema level. If a prospective customer asks to remove any of these, we decline the pilot. We have.
Protectee-scoped, not population-scoped.
Backtrack answers "who is tailing this protectee, during this SDR run." It does not answer "who accompanies vehicle X around the city." There is no query surface for population-level movement analysis. The schema itself refuses such a query.
Short default, warrant to extend.
Raw plate reads age out in 72 hours by default. Evidence packets for triggered alerts enter a judicial-hold vault with a 24-month ceiling. Any long-hold requires a named authorization tied to a named protectee and a named threat. No "just in case" retention.
Every query is logged, un-deletable.
Every SDR run, every analyst query, every evidence retrieval writes to an append-only audit stream visible to the inspector general or designated oversight body. Operators cannot delete their own tracks. An abuse attempt — "let me run an SDR on my ex-wife" — leaves fingerprints a supervisor can act on.
Data Protection Impact Assessment shipped, not retrofitted.
Each customer deployment is preceded by a DPIA tailored to the jurisdiction, the camera population, and the protectee categories. The DPIA is a deliverable, not a footnote. Vendor maintains a reference DPIA, published in-country, for supervisory-authority review.
No faces. No phone IDs. Pedestrians are a walled-off extension.
Face recognition and device-ID (IMSI / Bluetooth / Wi-Fi) correlation are not in any Backtrack configuration — they would break the legal basis and widen the blast radius of misuse. The core product is vehicle-only. The optional Backtrack-Foot extension (§12) adds narrow whole-body appearance analytics under a supplementary DPIA, a separate authorization envelope, stricter retention, and a higher alert threshold. It is not enabled by default, and several of its detectors ship disabled even when it is licensed.
Deployments we will not take.
We decline deployments whose obvious purpose is monitoring of journalists, lawful political opposition, assembly participants, or any protected category. This is not a brand choice; it is a contract clause and a termination-for-cause trigger. Our board of directors is informed of rejected customers quarterly.
These constraints are a feature, not a cost.
Off-the-shelf ALPR and city-surveillance platforms from well-known vendors do not ship these guardrails. That is why their customers include a list of governments we will not work with. Backtrack's EU market is built on the fact that the guardrails ship in the box.
Foot-mobile surveillance detection. Walled off for a reason.
Hostile services run foot tails constantly — in malls, transit stations, squares, narrow old-town streets where vehicles cannot follow. A case officer who drives a clean vehicle SDR can still pick up a three-person rotating foot team the moment they step out of the car. Backtrack-Foot is the pedestrian analogue of the vehicle core: the same four detectors (co-travel, set-level, parallel-route, static-OP) applied to whole-body appearance embeddings instead of plate reads.
It is not part of the default deployment. It ships as a separately licensed, separately authorized module under stricter constraints than the vehicle core, because pedestrian appearance embeddings are biometric data under GDPR Article 9 and LED Article 10. The reason this section exists at all is that foot-mobile surveillance is too operationally important to ignore. The reason it is walled off from the core is that "whole-body biometrics" is the line that separates a CI counter-surveillance tool from a mass-surveillance suite. We do not cross that line by accident.
Vehicle → foot handoff
Adversary trails the officer by vehicle to the metro station, where vehicles cannot follow. A foot team picks up at the platform. Vehicle core is blind from that moment. Foot module sees the new tail enter the same turnstile bank the protectee did, within the run window.
Venue / event surveillance
At a diplomatic reception, a courthouse, an embassy event — vehicles park and wait. Foot surveillance circulates inside. Vehicle core sees nothing; foot module flags the same person seen at three receptions the protectee attended in the last three weeks.
Narrow-street urban cores
Old-town districts, pedestrian-only streets, covered markets. Vehicles physically cannot tail here; skilled services know this and plan their foot packages around it. Exactly the zones where foot module earns its keep.
Dead-drop / brush pass
Two persons whose paths co-travel for 6–12 seconds at a bench, a café table, a park gate — classic dead-drop or brush-pass pattern. Flagged asynchronously for analyst review, never for real-time officer alert. Evidence packet includes timestamp, camera frames, embeddings.
Bag-not-body cue
Surveillance operators change jackets but carry the same equipment bag four days running. Bag color, shape, strap configuration are persistent across clothing changes. Foot module tracks bag-as-fingerprint alongside whole-body embedding; disagreement between the two is itself a signal.
Pre-positioned café
"Same patron seen at your café fourteen days running before you arrived." Caught only by PoL-on-pedestrians — which is why this detector ships DISABLED by default and requires a supplementary DPIA addendum plus supervisory-authority consult before a customer can enable it.
Why this is walled off from the core
Pedestrian re-identification, even without face recognition, is biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person. That is Article 9 under GDPR, Article 10 under the Law Enforcement Directive. Special-category data. Stricter legal basis. Mandatory DPIA with supervisory-authority consultation. In several EU member states a separate statutory authorization is required before the module can even be activated.
Because of this, Backtrack-Foot is sold only with the six constraints on the right. We decline deployments that ask for any of them to be weakened. We publish the module's reference DPIA, we accept supervisory-authority audit as a licensing condition, and we maintain a separate customer-acceptance workflow — foot deployments do not route through the same pipeline as the vehicle core.
Six constraints that keep Foot defensible
- Retentionrun window + 30 min
- Indexembeddings · never identities
- Authorizationseparate token per run
- Thresholdraised · analyst-first
- Featureswhole-body · no gait · no face
- Static-OP detectorOFF by default
What the foot fingerprint contains
Deliberately narrower than vehicle re-ID. No face. No gait. No iris. No ear shape. No voiceprint. We take the appearance cues that survive short-term clothing variation — because those are what matter for catching a tail during a run — and we stop there.
Whole-body shape
Height band, build, posture. Coarse body-shape embedding. Survives clothing changes across the same run. Deliberately low-resolution — not a medical-imaging biometric, not a gait analysis.
Color blocks
Upper-body / lower-body / outerwear dominant colors. Logo presence (not logo identity). Hi-vis elements. Same-run matching is strong; next-day matching across a fresh outfit is explicitly weak — by design.
Carried objects
Bag presence, approximate size, color, strap style. Umbrella. Sunglasses. Phone-in-hand. Visible earpiece. Accessories swap fast; bags tend to persist across a multi-day surveillance cycle.
Shoes that persist
Color and approximate type (sneaker / dress / boot). Shoes persist across clothing changes more than jackets do — surveillance operators choose shoes for long shifts and rarely swap them.
Movement pattern
Walking speed band, direction-of-travel, phone-in-hand duration, pause patterns. Coarse context cues — not identifying on their own, but they thicken the evidence against a candidate embedding.
What we never capture
Face recognition. Iris. Ear shape. Tattoo matching. Gait biometrics. Voiceprint. Any crosswalk to civil registry, driver-license photos, or social-media images. Any "accessory-to-purchase-record" lookup. Any persistent pedestrian index outside a run window.
Analyst-only cues · probable foot tail
Like the vehicle analyst-only list, these are cues too weak or too context-dependent to auto-score but valuable to an experienced SD analyst. Surfaced as evidence rows, never as officer alerts.
- Phone-in-hand too long without ever looking at it — radio-discipline pattern
- Earpiece visible, especially coiled-cable style
- Matching bag (gym / messenger / backpack) across multiple observations
- Comfortable walking shoes that don't match the rest of the outfit
- Pausing to take photos at angles that don't frame landmarks
- Two people "not together" whose pace adjusts in sync with the protectee
- Person exits a vehicle at NODE-X, re-enters a different vehicle at NODE-Y
- Pedestrian arrives at a venue 15+ min before protectee, repeatedly
- Loitering pattern inconsistent with venue type — café patron with no drink
- Body language: scanning rather than browsing · phone-glances on a schedule
Foot-specific guardrails · in addition to core guardrails (§11)
No persistent pedestrian index.
Pedestrian embeddings exist only for the duration of a registered SDR run plus a 30-minute tail, then are cryptographically erased. There is no 60-day rolling pedestrian PoL baseline in the default deployment, because that would require a persistent index of persons across the city — which is exactly the mass-surveillance shape we refuse.
Foot is not a sub-setting of Vehicle.
Enabling foot analytics for a run requires its own authorization token — signed by a different authority at the customer ministry than the vehicle token. Vehicle mode cannot silently turn on foot mode. The separation is enforced in the schema, not a process norm.
Filed and reviewed before go-live.
Each customer enabling Backtrack-Foot files a supplementary DPIA addendum with the national supervisory authority before the module is activated. Reference DPIA is published; customer-specific addenda cover the local legal basis, the scope of protectees, and the camera population in use.
The earpiece is rare.
The foot module's alert threshold is raised relative to vehicle core so that almost all hits land in the analyst review queue rather than the officer's earpiece. This is not a bug — pedestrian re-ID is noisier than vehicle re-ID, and a false-positive flood would drive operators to ignore the system.
Pre-positioning detector is a separate opt-in.
The PoL / static-OP detector for pedestrians requires a persistent baseline that is legally and ethically the hardest part of this module. It is OFF in the default foot configuration. Enabling it requires an additional DPIA supplement and named authority at the supervisory level, which we treat as an exception, not a default option.
What we will never add to this module.
Face recognition. Gait biometrics. Iris / ear / tattoo matching. Voiceprint. Any crosswalk to civil registry, driver's-license photos, or social media. Any deployment that asks for any of these is declined; this is a contract clause, not a preference.
Foot is a capability. It is also a liability if mis-scoped.
We built it because the operational need is real, and because keeping foot-surveillance detection out of customer ministries' hands means ceding the space to vendors with fewer guardrails. We walled it off because the legal shape is genuinely different. Both sentences are true at once — and keeping them both true is the design.
Built for the field officer. Scales to the protectee.
The primary deployment is counter-intelligence and counter-surveillance for ministry-of-interior officers operating in-country. The secondary applications, which share the same engine with scoped authorization, are close-protection for dignitaries, judges and witnesses — plus counter-terrorism pre-attack surveillance-detection. The analytics are identical; the authorization, the allow-list and the DPIA differ.
Primary · intelligence officer protection
Case officer with a source meet
Officer travels to a source meeting. SDR registered 60 min prior. Four chokepoints on a loop through the diplomatic quarter and the mall district. System flags a candidate tail before the last chokepoint; officer aborts the meet, restarts the process next week. Source is not compromised.
Counter-intelligence vehicle sweep
CI team runs a routine corridor sweep looking for hostile service pre-positioning. Backtrack's static-OP detector surfaces a vehicle that has parked near a sensitive site 14 times in 21 days. Analyst investigates. Plate traces to a foreign-diplomatic pool — confirmed surveillance.
Detecting adversary mapping of own fleet
Run the analytic backwards: over the last 30 days, what non-own-fleet vehicles have been co-located with our ministry's vehicle pool too often? Surfaces adversary pattern-of-life analysis targeting the service itself. Quiet, background, continuous.
Secondary · dignitary, judicial & witness protection
Ministerial & dignitary detail
Close-protection lead registers the principal's planned routes daily. Backtrack runs silently in the background against the city graph. An anomalous co-travel or static-OP hit escalates to the detail's intelligence cell, not the principal. Motorcade never sees the alert unless the lead decides it matters.
Judge and witness protection
Judge handling OC cases. Protected witness in pre-trial. Both get PoL and static-OP analytics on their home / court / safe-house cameras. The analytic that catches pre-attack surveillance against a field officer catches pre-intimidation surveillance against a judge — the pipeline is the same.
Embassy & foreign mission
Host-nation service protects a diplomatic mission from third-country surveillance. Mission vehicles register SDR runs; anomalous co-travel with host-nation's own intelligence is explicitly excluded from alerts through the deconfliction protocol — Backtrack is a counter-hostile-surveillance tool, not a host-nation sovereignty weapon.
Secondary · counter-terrorism pre-attack indicators
Pre-attack surveillance of a venue
Terrorist cells do their own SDR on their target — a venue, a transport node, a utility, a VIP residence. Static-OP and PoL detectors surface repeated unexplained visits by vehicles associated (by graph distance) with watchlisted plates. Output feeds the CT fusion cell for human review. Never a solo trigger for action — always one input among many.
Restraining-order enforcement
Narrower, warranted scope: restrained-party vehicle plate added to the watch against the protected party's movement. Pattern-of-life alerts if the restrained plate appears near the protected's home or workplace. Evidence packet supports prosecution for order violation.
Organized-crime surveillance-of-target
Plate set associated with an OC cell is watched for co-travel with potential targets (rival leadership, cooperating witnesses, specific judges). Set-level co-travel escalates to the OC investigative unit — same engine, different authorization, different watchlist.
What "good" looks like, when it works.
These are design targets for the correlation node, the edge node and the operator app. All subject to validation in a pilot deployment. Nothing on this table has been measured on real field hardware. We publish the targets so they can be argued with, not because they are a promise.
| Component | Metric | Target |
|---|---|---|
| Edge node | Concurrent 1080p feeds | 8–16 per node |
| Edge node | ALPR plate-read precision | ≥ 98% · EU formats · day/night/weather |
| Edge node | ALPR throughput | ~80 plate reads/sec · mixed feeds |
| Edge node | Re-ID embedding throughput | ~15 embeddings/sec · 512-D |
| Edge node | Hardware | ARM SoC + 8 TOPS NPU · 12 W typical |
| Edge node | Form factor | 1U · DIN rail · IP55 enclosure variant |
| Re-ID (vehicle) | Fingerprint families | 7 families · ~30 attributes per read |
| Re-ID (vehicle) | Full fingerprint extraction | ~150 ms / detection · edge NPU |
| Re-ID (vehicle) | Fingerprint size per read | ~3 KB · 512-D embedding + attribute vector |
| Re-ID (vehicle) | City-level FAISS lookup | < 100 ms against ~500K vehicles |
| Re-ID (vehicle) | Evidential bits per fingerprint | ~40–60 bits · decomposable, analyst-reviewable |
| Foot module (ext.) | Enabled by default | NO · separately licensed, separately authorized |
| Foot module (ext.) | Pedestrian embedding size | ~1.5 KB · whole-body only |
| Foot module (ext.) | Cross-clothing accuracy (same run) | ≥ 70% · design target |
| Foot module (ext.) | Retention | run window + 30 min · cryptographic erase |
| Foot module (ext.) | Static-OP detector | OFF by default · opt-in + supplementary DPIA |
| Foot module (ext.) | Excluded features | face · gait · iris · voiceprint · civil-registry crosswalk |
| Correlation node | Cameras served | up to 400 per hot/hot pair |
| Correlation node | Plate reads ingested | ~800 / sec steady state |
| Correlation node | Concurrent SDR runs | up to 40 · typical 4–8 |
| Correlation node | Alert latency (hit → tablet) | ≤ 4 s · p95 |
| Correlation node | Detection precision @ p < 10⁻⁴ | ≥ 85% · pilot target |
| Correlation node | Detection recall @ p < 10⁻⁴ | ≥ 70% · pilot target · professional tail |
| Operator app | Tablet | Android · GrapheneOS · hardened |
| Operator app | Transport | Nexus Atlas bonded: LTE + mesh + SAT |
| Operator app | Offline run support | continues if correlation node reachable via any path |
| Audit | Log durability | append-only · tamper-evident · IG-streamable |
| Retention | Raw plate reads (default) | 72 h |
| Retention | Evidence packet (judicial hold) | up to 24 mo · per authorization |
| Retention | PoL baseline window | 60 d · bucket-level · no per-plate dossier |
There are five adjacent categories. We are none of them.
Generic ALPR / ANPR vendors
A generic ALPR vendor sells plate reads at the camera and a search UI. They do not run co-travel analytics, do not model pattern-of-life, do not do vehicle re-ID, and have no concept of a surveillance-detection route. Backtrack can ingest a generic ALPR's plate reads, but the generic ALPR cannot deliver what Backtrack delivers. Generic ALPR is a sensor; Backtrack is a tradecraft engine.
City-surveillance suites (well-known vendors)
Several foreign vendors sell "safe-city" suites that do mass population-scoped analytics, face-rec, pedestrian re-ID, and unconstrained movement graphs. They are sold to governments we do not work with. Backtrack is structurally not that: vehicle-only, protectee-scoped, short-retention, judicially-gated. It is the product the EU market asks for instead of those suites.
OSINT / travel-analytics platforms
Services that correlate public flight, AIS, and social-media data for travel pattern-of-life. Useful for different questions. Backtrack is an on-the-ground, real-time, urban co-travel tool. Adjacent, not competing — some customers will run both, for different phases of their work.
Counter-IMSI / RF-based CS tools (incl. Bastion)
Cellular counter-surveillance (rogue base station detection, IMSI-catcher spotting) is a different sensor modality. The two pair: an IMSI catcher near a Backtrack-flagged static-OP vehicle is a much higher-confidence signal than either alone. Bastion and Backtrack are deliberately separate products that compose at the fusion layer.
Tradecraft training & manual SD teams
Ex-service SD instructors train officers to do it by eye. They will still be in business after Backtrack ships — the officer still has to drive the SDR, read the alert, and make the call. What Backtrack replaces is the three-person SD overwatch team that a modern service can no longer staff for every run.
Private-sector "investigations" SaaS
Commercial investigation platforms bolt license-plate lookups onto consumer-facing dashboards with none of the legal basis, none of the retention controls, and an unbounded query surface. Backtrack is specifically not that. We sell to warranted government operators, with a DPIA, or we do not sell at all.
Three curves cross in 2026.
Urban camera density
Most European cities now have municipal + transit + ministerial camera density of 1 per 80–120 m in their central districts. A 30-minute SDR run traverses 60+ camera sectors. The raw material exists; nobody is fusing it correctly.
Edge AI maturity
ARM-class NPUs at 8 TOPS for <$200 make on-camera ALPR + vehicle re-ID practical, at edge power budgets that fit a traffic cabinet. What required a dedicated server 3 years ago now fits in a DIN-rail box.
Legal framework crystallized
LED 2016/680 and national transpositions are now 3–5 years old. The compliance shape of a legitimate CI-class system is settled. It is now easier to sell a narrow, guardrailed product into a European ministry than it was in 2020 — and correspondingly harder to sell an unconstrained one.
Pilot, harden, scale.
Who we want to talk to.
Backtrack is pre-prototype. Before we write code for the correlation engine we want to settle the DPIA template, the deconfliction protocol, and the operator phraseology with real field users. If you run a CI directorate, a PPD, a witness-protection unit, a CT fusion cell, or a judicial-protection office, and the problem on this page matches a problem on your desk, we would like to talk.
Pilot partners
- Ministry-of-interior counter-intelligence directorates
- Protective-detail commands (ministerial, diplomatic, judicial)
- Witness-protection units
- Counter-terrorism fusion cells
- National data-protection authorities (as consultative partners)
Initial engagement
- Walk-through of the CONOPS and guardrails, off-the-record
- Review of your SD tradecraft against Backtrack's detector set
- Joint DPIA drafting workshop for your jurisdiction
- Pilot-corridor selection and chokepoint-entropy evaluation
- Red-team scenario design for Gate 01